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Interbank payment and settlement ﬂows have changed substantially in the
last decade. This paper applies social network analysis to settlement data
from the Bank of Japan Financial Network System (BOJ-NET) to examine
the structure of transactions in the interbank money market. We ﬁnd that
interbank payment ﬂows have changed from a star-shaped network with
money brokers mediating at the hub to a decentralized network with nu-
merous other channels. We note that this decentralized network includes
a core network composed of several ﬁnancial subsectors, in which these
core nodes serve as hubs for nodes in the peripheral sub-networks. This
structure connects all nodes in the network within two to three steps of
links. The network has a variegated structure, with some clusters of in-
stitutions on the periphery, and some institutions having strong links with
the core and others having weak links. The structure of the network is
a critical determinant of systemic risk, because the mechanism in which
liquidity shocks are propagated to the entire interbank market, or like-
wise absorbed in the process of propagation, depends greatly on network
topology. Shock simulation examines the propagation process using the
settlement data.
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The payment and settlement ﬂows of Japan’s interbank money market have changed
substantially, in step with the introduction in January 2001 of real-time gross settle-
ment (RTGS), the implementation of the quantitative easing policy, the emergence of
asset management trusts, the increase in direct-dealing transactions, and the abolish-
ment of settlements through money brokers’ accounts. We extract data on interbank
transactions from the settlement data of the Bank of Japan Financial Network Sys-
tem (BOJ-NET), and then use network theory, which has increasingly been applied
to the social sciences in recent years, to measure, using a variety of network statis-
tics, the characteristics of the interbank market’s complex fund ﬂows, viewed as a
transaction network.
We also examine the structural changes in interbank transactions that have occurred
as a result of the above-noted factors, comparing data for December 1997, which was
prior to the introduction of RTGS and implementation of the zero interest rate policy
(ZIRP), with data for December 2005, which was under RTGS and while the quantita-
tive easing policy after ZIRP was in force. Much of these structural changes reﬂected
changes in settlement practices that will be discussed in Section III.C.
We ﬁnd that interbank payment ﬂows have changed from a star-shaped network
with money brokers mediating at the hub to a decentralized network with numerous
other channels. Whereas in December 1997 the linkages were concentrated on money
brokers, in December 2005 there were more ﬁnancial institutions with multiple trans-
action partners, and this resulted in a further decentralization of the network. We also
found that those institutions that originally had a small number of links saw an even
further decrease in the number of their links, and that this tendency was stronger for
incoming network in which links were measured only for ﬁrms’ funding.
A close examination of the decentralized network structure in 2005 (December,
here and below) shows that the core of the overall network comprises a sub-network.
This core network includes money brokers, major banks, asset management trusts, trust
banks, major securities ﬁrms, afﬁliated ﬁnancial institutions, and some large regional
banks, among which there are very close links, almost to the point of a complete
network, that is, every node linked to every other node. The components of this core
network serve as a hub for ﬁnancial institutions on the network’s periphery, and should
thereby play a critical role in the ﬂow of funds through the network.
Financial institutions participating in the transaction network are closely linked
through the core network, and a connection to a broad range of ﬁnancial institutions can
be achieved through only two or three legs. The network’s structure on the periphery
is not uniform, but rather quite varied, with clusters forming based on mutual ties with
speciﬁc members on the periphery. These include such ﬁnancial institutions as those
witheitherstrongorweaktiestoaportionofthecore,but relativelyweaktieswithother
peripheral ﬁnancial institutions, those that are linked to the core virtually independently,
those with a variety of links to the core, and those with almost no link to the core at all.
The structure of the network is a critical determinant of systemic risk. The pro-
cess by which a liquidity shock triggered by a ﬁnancial institution within the network,
such as a delayed settlement or failure to execute a payment caused by a shortage of
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funds, propagates to the overall interbank market, or likewise is absorbed on the way of
propagation, depends greatly on network topology. We analyze the network’s structure
to see what that implies regarding the stability, and robustness to shocks, of interbank
transactions. We ﬁnd that knowledge of network structure can provide valuable input to
a central bank’s process of designing systems to supply liquidity to the market.
It is very difﬁcult to measure a network’s dynamic reaction to shocks using a qual-
itative approach based on static structural information. Simulation analysis provides
a valuable tool for studying ﬁnancial contagion, and has proven to be an important
analytical approach in the recent literature. How a liquidity shock as described above
propagates across the network under RTGS depends greatly on information about set-
tlement value (which equates to the “thickness” of linkages) and about the sequence and
timing of payments. In Appendix 1, we run a simulation based on actual data as a ﬁrst
approximation, albeit under several strong assumptions on the reaction of participants
against the propagation caused by an initial shock.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the literature that
uses network analysis to investigate interbank payment structures and the structure of
payment ﬂows over settlement systems.
1 During this process, we provide commentary
on the statistics used in network analysis, while also examining the signiﬁcance of the
statistics from the perspective of systemic risk. In Section III, we introduce the data
used in our analysis and provide an overview of the structure of interbank transactions
as well as of structural changes between two points in time. In Section IV, we examine
the structural characteristics of the interbank market using both statistics and visual
analysis with a network graph, and see what that implies regarding the interbank mar-
ket’s stability and robustness to shocks. In Section V, we summarize our conclusions.
Appendix 1 shows the results from a simulation of payment delay/default contagion
across the network caused by a liquidity shock. Appendix 2 provides a commentary
on the characteristics of the “power law distribution” often observed in many differ-
ent social networks, and shows that the same characteristics are seen in the interbank
transaction network.
II. Recent Literature and Network Statistics
Interbank transactions lead to a complex web of credits and debits among ﬁnancial
institutions. The interbank money markets, one of which is a market for the mone-
tary policy, have become increasingly diverse in both market participants and products
traded as a result of globalization and ﬁnancial market advancements, and this has
made it considerably more complex. The world’s central banks have analyzed in various
ways, from the perspective of examining systemic risk, what changes have occurred in
interbank money markets and how these changes have impacted the market’s stability
and robustness to shocks.
In this section, we introduce literature focused on analyzing the structure of inter-
bank transaction networks. While doing so, we provide commentary on the network
1. It is noted that literature survey does not cover recent studies after 2006, when this work was prepared for the
2006 Financial System Report (Bank of Japan [2006]).
109statistics used in this research, and consider their signiﬁcance in the context of sys-
temic risk.
2 Only a portion of this literature uses static analyses of network structure,
while much of it focuses on interbank market contagion and a dynamic analysis of its
probability as well as depth and stretch. Nearly all of the literature uses simulation as
an analytical tool.
This is probably an anomaly caused by data constraints. Because of the difﬁculty
in obtaining data on individual interbank transactions, direct analysis of network struc-
ture is rare. Consequently, the literature has largely had to use the debit/credit data of
individual ﬁnancial institutions to approximate, one way or another, matrices on the
debit/credit relationships among ﬁnancial institutions, and then use this as a basis for
studying contagion instead of primary work to examine real transaction data. Because
the debit/credit data on




result of this approximation is crucially affected by the assumed network structure. In
addition, as we show in the next section, actual networks have heterogeneous structures
that make it extremely difﬁcult to deduce the matrices.
3 Accordingly, a network analysis
applied to such estimated data elicits nothing more than information on model assump-
tions, rendering it virtually meaningless. Because of the limit of data and methodology,
the literature has focused on dynamic analysis to obtain generalized knowledge of the
transmission of shocks, which provides valuable information for studying systemic risk.
As the usefulness of such analysis became recognized, the regulatory authorities
started empirically analyzing contagion using actual data they have on debits/credits
among ﬁnancial institutions, as well as actual transaction data from the payment sys-
tem provided by central banks. There is also considerable literature, primarily from
central banks, regarding the stability and efﬁciency of the settlement system, which
is inseparable from the payment of interbank transactions. Some of these literatures
perform simulations and stress tests on actual settlement data.
4
2. Network analysis has become a popular tool in the economics and ﬁnance ﬁelds, largely owing to the recent
rapid development of social network analysis. Sociology has devoted more time to the study of real social net-
works, including personal connections and regional communities. The main thrust of this research is on human
behavior and the composition of society and organizations, however, and there has been almost no quantitative
analysisofnetwork structures.In thegraph theoryarea ofmathematics,meanwhile,analysis,academicinnature,
has been focused on networks that have rules and can be dealt with analytically. However, recently proposed
models to express complex network structures that actually exist have enabled an understanding of networks
using statistics, which in turn has led to greater use of social network analysis through a synthesis with the two
preceding approaches. This approach has attracted attention in a wide variety of social sciences, and appeared in
a substantial body of literature, particularly since the concepts of a small-world network and scale-free network
were introduced in the 1990s. Interest in social networks is also rising in the ﬁeld of economics, and the lead
paper selected for the Ninth Econometric Society World Congress (held every ﬁve years) was Jackson (2007),
which presented several ways to apply social network analysis in economics.
3. In addition, even if accurate
￿
￿
￿ matrix data were obtainable, it would be nothing more than an aggregation
of credit with different payment dates and maturities, and estimating the individual transaction data needed to
analyze contagion would be impossible from such matrix data.
4. The representative literature includes the following. Sheldon and Maurer (1998) present pioneering empirical
research using the maximum entropy method to estimate a matrix of bilateral credit based on aggregate credit
data; Furﬁne (2003) proposes a simulation algorithm to describe the mechanism of a contagion through bank
failures; Upper and Worms (2004) and Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006) examine the effectiveness of safety
netsand central bank-supplied liquidityin controllingcontagion,endogenizingtheloss rateat default; Cifuentes,
Ferrucci, and Shin (2005) add the impact of declining asset prices caused by distress selling; Müller (2006)
examines how the presence of credit lines magniﬁes the contagion due to sudden loss of the credit line at the
default of the credit supplier; Blåvarg and Nimander (2002) and Mistrulli (2005) use data on bilateral credit
exposure obtained from bank regulators; Amundsen and Arnt (2005) use transaction data from the settlement
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We introduce below literature that uses network analysis to examine the structure
of interbank transactions. Studies can be broken down into three types, depending on
the data used: that using data on bilateral bank exposures, that extracting data on indi-
vidual transactions from the settlement system, and that using transaction data received
from interbank market operators.
A. Pioneering Research Using Data on Bilateral Bank Exposures
Research using data on bilateral bank exposures includes Müller (2003) and Müller
(2006), both of which use internal data from the Swiss National Bank on large-value
interbank exposures.
5 First we introduce Müller (2003), while also explaining the
network statistics used in the analysis.
Müller (2003) notes that Swiss banks are obligated to report to the Swiss National
Bank their credit lines and value of exposure in the interbank market, including off-
balance-sheet transactions, to the top 10 (top 20 for large banks) counterparties in terms
of that exposure. Using a graph to visualize the debit/credit structure of approximately
300 banks (including foreign bank
6 and credit cooperatives), it ﬁnds the following.
(1) Two large banks serve as hubs for the interbank market, and transactions between
other banks are few and far between, making the network’s linkage density (number
of existing bilateral banking transaction pairs divided by the total potential number of
pairs) extremely sparse, and the network structure therefore very centralized. However,
(2) grouping separately the 24 cantonal banks and more than 80 regional banks, each
group forms its own sub-network with its own characteristics. (3) Speciﬁcally, the can-
tonal banks in the former group tend to transact with each other, with the members
forming homogenous links, resulting in a less sparse network density. (4) The regional
banks in the latter group have a strong tendency to focus their transactions on a single
counterparty, resulting in a centralized network.
Müller (2003) uses various statistics for its network analysis in an attempt to quan-
tify the network structure. The network is made up of nodes (members) and their links,
as well as the quantity of information contained in these nodes and links. The nodes are
also referred to as vortexes, and the links between them are also referred to as ties.
7 The
mostbasicstatisticisthenumberoflinksheldbyeachnode,termeddegree.Thenumber
of links whereby the bank provides funding or credit is termed out-degrees, and number
of links aimed at procuring funding is termed in-degrees. The strength of the links
held by each mode is also expressed as valued degree. When looking at the network in
terms of exposure as in Müller (2003), out-strength (valued out-degree) equates to each
bank’s gross credits, and in-strength (valued in-degree) equates to their gross liabilities.
system provided by the central bank in a similar manner of Furﬁne (2003); Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer
(2006) and Boss et al. (2006) consider a macro shock as an upsurge of credit and market risks damaging the
banking sector, which causes a bank failure and triggers default contagion under weakened bank portfolios.
There are also many empirical studies such as Degryse and Nguyen (2007), Wells (2004), and Van Lelyveld and
Liedorp (2006).
5. Müller (2006) develops Müller (2003) with a focus on analyzing contagion, using reported data on credit lines to
run simulations, including of the possibility of a solvent bank defaulting owing to difﬁculty in getting funding.
Müller (2006) omits that portion of the network analysis using statistics shown in Müller (2003).
6. Domestic banks in Switzerland have exposure to foreign banks in their domestic interbank market, and must
report data on this exposure if it ranks within the top 10 or 20.
7. We use the everyday term “link” in this paper, although the academic terms for link are arc in a directed graph
and edge in an undirected graph.
111In contrast, research using transaction data relies on two types of quantitative data, the
volume (number) of transactions, and the value (amount) of transactions, within a ﬁnite
period. Müller (2003) considers banks with higher degree and strength to be closer to
the center of the debit/credit network, and therefore more important players within the
ﬁnancial system. In this respect, degree and strength are the most easily understood
statistics for measuring the centrality of a node within a network.
Considerable information can also be obtained based on the relationship between
degree and strength. Müller (2003) showed that because of the strong positive correla-
tion between credits and debits (out-degree and in-degree), banks with a large number
ofcreditcounterpartiesalsohadalargenumber ofdebitcounterparties,andalsoshowed
that the positive correlation between out-strength and out-degree was weaker than that
betweenin-strengthandin-degree,whichimpliesthatbankswithalargevalueofcredits
did not necessarily have these credits with a large number of banks, suggesting the
possibility that their credits were concentrated with certain banks. It also shows a high
correlation between in-degree and out-strength, suggesting a tendency for banks that
have liabilities with a large number of counterparties to also have a large value of
credits. The contagion effects on the overall network are likely to be larger in the case
of a default of such a bank, even when compared with other banks high in both degree
and strength.
Such contagion effects cannot be measured if the only information is on the de-
gree and strength of each node. In addition, the network density described above is
nothing more than an indication of connectivity, in other words, the average proba-
bility that a link exists between two random nodes, making it impossible to know the
contagion effects from a network’s heterogeneous structure. To address this, Müller
(2003) measures both distance (the minimum number of steps to link nodes
￿ and
￿)
and average distance (the average distance between node
￿ and all other nodes
￿),
8
and treats nodes with a shorter average distance as more centrally positioned in the
network. The maximum reach of each node via linkages is called the inﬂuence domain,
and measured either as the number of reachable nodes or the percentage of them to all
nodes. This is a valuable statistic for knowing a contagion’s maximum reachable area.
With these statistics related to distance and domain, like those related to degree and
strength, it is possible to measure separately based on the direction of credit (whether it
is a receivable or payable).
Although the network density measured by Müller (2003) was a very sparse 3 per-
cent, all nodes had a 97 percent inﬂuence domain, meaning that no matter where a
contagion starts, it could reach nearly all banks. The average distance of each node
ranged from 1.4 at the shortest (one of the two large banks) to six at the longest, with
the overall average of all nodes very short at 2.5, suggesting that nearly all banks can
be reached in very few steps.
9
In addition to the average distance statistic, Müller (2003) used betweenness cen-
trality. While the former measures centrality (closeness) to other nodes, the latter ex-
presses the contribution that a third node can make as a waypoint along the shortest
8. This is also referred to as path length and average path length.
9. The maximum distance for each node is called eccentricity. The greatest eccentricity among all nodes is referred
to as the network diameter.
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route between two other nodes.
10 Betweenness centrality for node
￿ uses the number of
paths with the shortest distance between nodes
￿ and
￿ as the denominator, and the
number of the shortest paths that go through node
￿ as the numerator, and an aggregate
total for every
￿-
￿ pair is calculated for every node
￿. Of two banks A and B with the
same degree, if bank A has a higher betweenness centrality, it means that, relative to
bank B, it is located on a more important paths in the network, is more likely to be
involved in the transmission of a liquidity shock and, if it becomes unable to pay a
transaction, is more likely to have a larger impact on the network. Müller (2003) found
that in addition to the two large banks, three cantonal banks, one regional bank, and
three foreign banks had high betweenness centrality and were a potential channel for
contagion. The more important a bank is as a debtor, the greater is its tendency to have
a high betweenness centrality and occupy an important position within the network, in
contrast with banks that are important as a creditor, where no such tendency exists.
B. Research Using Settlement Data
Inaoka et al. (2004) use BOJ-NET settlement data, from roughly the same period stud-
ied by Müller (2003), to analyze payment networks. A primary funds settlement with
large value done by ﬁnancial institutions is the settlement through the BOJ’s current
account, where interbank and other transactions are settled via transfers.
11 Interbank
transactions comprise the bulk of these transfer settlements excluding the receipt or
payment of funds for Japanese government bonds (JGBs).
12
In contrast with using stock data as in Müller (2003), observing the network struc-
ture using transaction data requires accumulating data over a deﬁned period. Inaoka
et al. (2004) use one month of settlement records to analyze the average network
structure during the month. There is also research that focuses on daily changes in the
shape of the network caused by transaction and settlement developments. This includes
Soramäki et al. (2006), mentioned below, which examined the impact that the 9/11
terrorist attacks had on U.S. interbank payment ﬂows using a daily analysis, as well as
Imakubo and Soejima (2010), which use BOJ-NET data to analyze payment recycling
(the use of funds received for the next payment) during the day, and show substantial
network structure differences between the morning and afternoon.
Hence analysis based on transaction and settlement data requires selecting a period
of observation that suits the purpose, including the time span that network structure is
to be examined. When using stock data, the choice of time periods becomes irrelevant,
10. As opposed to the concept of betweenness centrality, degree is referred to as local centrality, because it does
not take into account indirect links.
11. The BOJ’s current account is used by authorized ﬁnancial institutions to deposit and withdraw banknotes,
and also used for sending and receiving funds for various other purposes. Speciﬁcally, BOJ current account
transfers are used for the settlement of funds, and the settlement of payments on transactions for Japanese
government bonds (JGBs) and other securities, between two ﬁnancial institutions, as well as for ﬁnal settlement
of transactions made on private-sector deferred net settlement (DNS) systems. In addition, the BOJ makes
deposits to and withdrawals from current accounts to settle open market operations that it conducts with
ﬁnancial institutions, various loans, the receipt and payment of treasury funds, and the receipt and payment
of funds in conjunction with the issuance and redemption of JGBs.
12. The BOJ provides a central depository service for JGBs. This settlement is executed by the delivery versus
payment (DVP) system. DVP is a mechanism aimed at avoiding failures to receive either securities or payment
by ensuring that a delivery of securities occurs if, and only if, payment occurs. DVP accounts for approximately
half of all settlements through the BOJ current account, both in volume and value of transactions.
113but data as detailed as the maturity dates (and payment timing) of the individual credits/
debits are often unusable, and thus must be ignored when running simulations and other
dynamic analysis.
Inaoka et al. (2004) focused on the distribution of each node’s degree within the
network structure. A network created by randomly selecting two nodes and establishing
a link between them is called a random network. The probability of a given node being
selected is given by the network density (or connectivity), and thus the degree distri-
bution within a random network is a Poisson distribution. Within a real social network,
however, there are a large number of high-degree nodes with a very large number of
links, and in most cases the links are unlikely to have been formed randomly. Actual
studies of degree distribution have found many such distributions that have extremely
long tails and adhere to a power law distribution. Inaoka et al. (2004) showed that in the
payment network using the above-noted data, the power law distribution was observed
not only in degree but also in the number of transactions for each transacting pair.








with by far the highest degree and strength (as measured by the number of transactions)
were centrally positioned within the payment network.
13 They further conﬁrmed that
a comparison of degree distribution and the distribution of number of transactions for
eachtransactingpairinmonth-long observationsofthenetworktakeneverythirdmonth
from June 2001 until December 2002 showed no change in the tendency to follow a
power law distribution.
Contrast this with Soramäki et al. (2006), which use data from Fedwire, the settle-
ment system operated by the U.S. Federal Reserve System, to examine the structure of
the daily ﬂow of settlement funds. Their paper is not limited to interbank transactions,
but also analyzes the structure of the network created by the entire ﬂow of funds among
ﬁnancial institutions as well as Inaoka et al. (2004).
14 It uses various network statistics
for the 62 trading days in the ﬁrst quarter of 2004 to observe daily changes in network
structure, and found that there were daily changes in the network density, average
distance, degree distribution (the power indicator of the power law distribution), and
the size of the network as expressed in number of nodes and the value and volume of
settlements, and also found a pattern of seasonality at the beginning of the month, the
end of the month, and at mid-month when an increase in bond settlements results in
increased network size and density.
The paper also uses the concepts of assortative and disassortative to examine node
afﬁnity, with the former indicating greater afﬁnity among similar nodes, and the latter
indicating greater afﬁnity among dissimilar nodes. Soramäki et al. (2006) focus on the
13. A powerlawdistributionfollows adistributionfor whichtheexponentremainsthesameeven when multiplying
the stochastic variable by a constant. Such distributions are therefore also called scale-free, and a network that
followsapowerlawdistributioniscalledascale-free network.Thereasonswhysocialnetworkstendtobescale
free are shown by a number of theoretical models that look at the issue from the network creation mechanism,
that is, from the events that create links between nodes. The network creation mechanism is valuable not just
for understanding the current structural characteristics, but also for knowing how the network may change in
response to exogenous shocks and how a collapsed network recovers. Although addressed in these theoretical
models, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
14. Furﬁne (2003) attempts an analysis of contagion by extracting federal funds transactions from Fedwire
settlement data.
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correlation of the degree of the two nodes ending each link, and ﬁnding that correlation
to be negative, show that nodes with a small number of links tend to favor links with
nodes which have a large number of links and vice versa, and therefore that settle-
ment networks are disassortative. This is further conﬁrmed by the negative correlation
between a node’s degree and its average nearest neighbor degree (ANND).
The clustering coefﬁcient, a statistic for measuring the ease with which multiple
nodes within a group are able to form links, is found by dividing the number of links
within a given sub-network, deﬁned as all links connected to a given node (but not
including that node), by the total number of links possible within the sub-network.
The clustering coefﬁcient could also be thought of as measuring the density of a local
network consisting of all the nodes linked to the node in question, and in a random
network, would be the same as average density. Soramäki et al. (2006) found the distri-
bution of the clustering coefﬁcient for each node ranged widely from zero to one, and
was considerably larger than the network’s average density of 0.3 percent.
The links between nodes have a tendency to cluster in social networks. Personal
contact networks, for example, cluster by such social attributes as proximity to each
person’s residence and workplace. The realistic number of human links for a man
is limited compared with the number of nodes (total population), and therefore link
density tends to be sparse and clustered based on proximity. Despite this, in a social
network it is possible to have both clustering and a short average distance, as is the case
when measuring the distance of people with quite different social attributes and ﬁnding
that distance to be short, with connections established in very few steps (legs).
Soramäki et al. (2006) also found that the settlement networks studied were highly
clustered, but also had sparse network density and a short average distance: 2.62 during
the period observed. This type of network, known as a small-world network, is seen in
many different types of social networks, including personal friendships and corporate
associations. The attributes of a small-world network are likely to include a small num-
ber of hubs and the presence of shortcut links with distant nodes, and there are many
empirical studies of actual networks that support this. In a personal network, people
with a large number of acquaintances are equivalent to hubs, and links that connect
differing social attributes are equivalent to shortcuts.
Soramäki et al. (2006) also found the presence of sub-networks serving as hubs
for the entire network. They showed that although the network comprised more than
6,600 nodes and more than 70,000 links on the ﬁrst day of the observation period,
75 percent of the network’s total settlement value was paid and received within a sub-
network comprising only 66 nodes and 181 links, and 25 of these nodes comprised
another highly dense sub-network. The paper did not discuss the role played by this
core network, but we think it likely that it equates to a hub for an overall network
comprising a very large number of nodes, and thus has the small-world characteristics
noted above.
C. Research Using Transaction Data
When using settlement data to analyze the interbank transaction network, it is often
difﬁcult to isolate interbank transactions from settlement data. Particularly because the
f o c u si so nt h eﬂow of funds, it is necessary to identify the start and end of a funds
115transaction and then use only the settlement data at the start. In this paper as well
as in Furﬁne (2003), which analyzes contagion in federal funds transactions, various
artiﬁces are used to extract interbank transaction information from the settlement data.
In contrast, Iori et al. (2008) use transaction data to analyze the transaction network,
because Italy’s transitioning of interbank transactions to an electronic brokering sys-
tem (e-MID: electronic Market for Interbank Deposits) made it possible to use data
on individual transactions for overnight instruments made within that system. That
paper uses comparisons between 1999 and 2002 to check for structural changes in the
interbank market and analyzes the impact on daily changes brought by the buildup of
reserve deposits.
Looking at changes in the degree distribution that occurred during both years, Iori
et al. (2008) found a substantial decline in the overall out-degree distribution because
bank mergers resulted in a decline in the number of banks participating in e-MID to
177 from 215, but saw an increase in in-degree distribution. This indicates that banks
decreased the number of banks that they sent payments to overall, but increased the
number of banks that they received payments from. In addition, changes in the out-
strength distribution, which looks at monetary totals, indicated a tendency for the top-
ranked banks to decrease their value of transactions and for the lower-ranked banks to
increase their value of transactions, and changes in the in-strength distribution showed
that top-ranked banks increased the value of payments received. This shows that while
the top-ranked banks were major providers of funds in 1999, the lower-ranked banks
increased their role in providing funds in 2002, and the smaller value of funds provided
to each counterparty by the lower-ranked banks was offset by the top-ranked banks
increasing the number of banks from which they received funds, while the lower-ranked
banks focused their payments on the top-ranked banks.
Iori et al. (2008) suggest that these structural changes can be attributed to (1) a
rising demand for funds in regional economies during the 1999 boom, which made
the lower-ranked banks less inclined to provide funds on the interbank market, and the
reverse of this during the subsequent economic contraction; and (2) the introduction of
the euro at the start of 2001, which encouraged the top-ranked banks to provide funding
to foreign banks through voice-brokered transactions outside of the e-MID system, and
the tendency for the banks to seek funding in the domestic interbank market.
An analysis of daily changes seems to show banks making ﬁne adjustments to de-
posit reserve balances on the ﬁnal day of the reserve maintenance period to ensure that
they met reserve requirements. There was ﬁrst of all a tendency, on and immediately
prior to the ﬁnal day, to increase both the value and volume of transactions, and in
particular increases in volume occurred irrespective of bank size. From the perspective
of network topology, this suggests a tendency for both the degree and the clustering
coefﬁcient to increase. The clustering coefﬁcients except the ﬁnal day and several days
prior to the day were not signiﬁcantly higher than a random network, which is a differ-
ent result than that of Soramäki et al. (2006). We think that this lack of network clus-
tering reﬂects the vertical relationship in the transactions going from the top-ranked
banks to the lower-ranked banks, and to the small number of horizontal links between
the same layers. Iori et al. (2008) provide visual conﬁrmation of this with graphs.
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Another tendency that was observed both for the top-ranked and the lower-ranked
banks was that of focusing transactions on speciﬁc counterparties.
15 This tendency gets
weaker, however, as the ﬁnal day of the reserve maintenance period approaches. Iori
et al. (2008) note the reason for this is that getting funding to meet reserve requirements
takes precedence over counterparty selection, and this tends to result in an increase in
transactions with banks not normally transacted with. The increase in the clustering co-
efﬁcient noted above reﬂects this, and the decline in the network diameter approaching
the ﬁnal day is consistent with an increase in links, that is, the number of legs on the
shortest declines because new links can be created.
There are few examples of such network analysis using transaction data of indi-
vidual ﬁnancial institutions because of limited access to that data. As far as we know,
Italy is the only market where it was possible to use transaction data from an electronic
brokering system to analyze the interbank monetary transaction network. This paper
tries to examine the structure of interbank transaction as well as Soramäki et al. (2006)
and Iori et al. (2008) using a combination of network statistics.Table 1 shows a compar-
ison of the literature in terms of the statistics used and the network structure found. This
paper shows that the small world, scale-free, and disassortative characteristics identiﬁed
in the literature can also be observed in the Japanese interbank transaction network, and
also shows that this network has a two-tier structure, made up of a core and a periphery,
and that there is heterogeneous way to link the periphery to the core.
III. Structural Changes in Interbank Transactions
A. Data
The BOJ provides a current account for authorized ﬁnancial institutions. The account
is where ﬁnancial institutions keep their required reserves, and also functions as a set-
tlement asset for monetary and securities transactions between ﬁnancial institutions,
including the BOJ.
16
Transactions in the BOJ’s current account are settled through BOJ-NET, and it is
possible to extract the settlement data of interbank transactions. However, some errors
are generated in the data identiﬁcation, because we use the transaction practices for the
interbank markets such as values and counterparties of the transactions. In addition,
the settlement data include the monetary ﬂows both at the time of initial payment and
at the time of repayment, making it necessary to extract the data at the time of initial
payment in order to examine the transaction structure correctly.
17
15. This is based on the participation ratio, which measures the extent that strength is concentrated on some links,
and is given by the square of an individual link’s share of strength.
16. In addition, it has the role of holding reserves for payment of banknotes.
17. The simulation of liquidity shock transmission in Appendix 1 uses the funds ﬂow for both the initial payment
and the repayment. For example, when examining the impact in the case some ﬁnancial institutions become
unable to settle, the ﬂow at repayment is more important than the ﬂow at initial payment. Likewise, when
examining the secondary effect of an institution suspending an initial payment because the repayments it
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Next, we compare monetary transaction data for December 1997 and December
2005 while identifying the main characteristics (Table 2). Out of all the ﬁnancial in-
stitutions that deal with the BOJ’s current account, the number that had transactions in
December 2005 was 354, 20 percent less than the number that did so in December 1997.
In addition to a less active interbank transaction, we attribute this to the smaller number
of ﬁnancial institutions as a result of bank mergers. The same trend is evident when
looking separately at the number of counterparties for payments and for receipts. In
1997, there were roughly the same number of ﬁnancial institutions that made a payment
as the number that received a payment, but in 2005 there was a bigger decline in the
number that made a payment.
Meanwhile, the number of pairs of transacting institutions actually increased by
24 percent, to 1,709 pairs from 1,383 pairs, indicating more diversiﬁed transaction pair-





￿), there were actually 1,383 transaction pairs. The ratio of actual pairings
to possible pairings (the network’s average density) was 1.4 percent, which is very
low. In 2005 there were fewer institutions with a transaction than in 1997, and a larger
number of pairings, but the average network density was still quite small at 2.7 percent.
This means that the interbank transaction network is sparse. Interbank transfers are thus
conducted through the pairing of a limited number of institutions, and the transaction
structure of the interbank market can be expressed as the pattern of transaction pairing
and the value and volume of transactions for each pair.
Next, we see in Table 2 that both the total volume and total value of transactions
during the month declined by about 30 percent relative to 1997. Although changes in
the settlement practice for unsecured interbank money market were a major reason for
this large decline (as explained below), this also appears to strongly reﬂect the decline
in the money market transactions brought by the monetary easing policy.
B. Transaction Structure in December 2005
Looking ﬁrst at the December 2005 transaction values for each subsector, asset man-
agement trusts had roughly a 50 percent share of both the volume and value of inter-
bank loan supply (including the supply from investment trusts under the asset man-
agement trusts), which is clearly the major source of funds supplied to the interbank
market (Table 3), followed by the major banks and the regional banks, each of which
accounted for more than 10 percent of transaction value. The major banks used to be
the primary receivers of interbank loans, but the continued decline in bank lending
has increasingly given them a funds surplus, and turned them into providers of funds
partly (they are still receivers of funds on a net basis). Funds provided by money
brokers have been very small, in terms of both value and volume, compared to their
fund receipts. Money brokers now specialize in brokering unsecured interbank trans-
actions (except for intraday unsecured transactions) between fund providers and re-
cipients, and do not become a counterparty in settlements. Consequently, the numbers
in this paper, based on settlement data, probably capture deals by money brokers in
the secured and intraday interbank markets. The small sum of funds provided through
such brokerage is indicative of the weak demand for short-term loans in the interbank
money markets.
119Table 2 Summary of Interbank Transaction Data
December 1997 December 2005 Change
Number of ﬁnancial institutions
with an interbank transaction
during the period
444 354 –20%
Of the total, the number with
a payment
387 263 –32%





a BOJ current account
710
(end of ﬁscal 1997)
585
(end of ﬁscal 2005)
Number of pairings of
institutions with a transaction
1,383 pairs 1,709 pairs +24%






























Total number of transactions 56,858 18,940 –67%
Number of transactions for each
institution (payments/receipts):
Average 243/168 71/63 –71/–63%
Median 49/30 13/6 –73/–80%
Number of transactions for
each pair:
Average 41.1 11.1 –73%
Median 16 2 –88%
Total transaction value ¥1,145 tril. ¥322 tril. –72%
Average value per transaction ¥20.2 bil. ¥17 bil. –16%
Transaction value for each
institution (payments/receipts):
Average ¥4.90 tril./¥3.38 tril. ¥1.22 tril./¥1.08 tril. –75%/–68%
Median ¥441 bil./¥113 bil. ¥143 bil./¥12.1 bil. –67%/–89%
Transaction value for each pair:
Average ¥829 bil. ¥18,861 bil. +127%
Median ¥76.3 bil. ¥20 bil. –74%
Note: Average and median calculations only include ﬁnancial institutions that had a transaction.
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Table 3 Value and Volume of Transactions by Subsector (December 2005)
Transaction value (¥ trillions) Transaction volume (number)
Payments Receipts Payments Receipts
Major banks 40.4 13% 62.3 19% 1,186 6% 2,535 13%
Trust banks 20.2 6 11.7 4 1,260 7 582 3
Regional banks 44.8 14 5.8 2 2,543 13 492 3
Regional banks II 15.0 5 0.1 0 1,111 6 42 0
Credit unions 2.0 1 2.1 1 323 2 631 3
Securities companies 1.9 1 7.9 2 181 1 677 4
Foreign banks 9.9 3 23.0 7 586 3 931 5
Foreign securities companies 1.4 0 8.1 3 100 1 377 2
Foreign trust banks 8.0 2 0.0 0 191 1 11 0
Money brokers 13.0 4 186.6 58 552 3 11,680 62
Asset management trusts 146.8 46 0.9 0 9,657 51 118 1
Securities ﬁnancial companies 5.3 2 6.1 2 95 1 356 2
Afﬁliated ﬁnancial institutions 11.2 3 5.9 2 1,009 5 390 2
Public ﬁnancial institutions 1.9 1 1.6 1 100 1 89 0
Total 322.4 100% 322.4 100% 18,940 100% 18,940 100%
Note: Percentage indicates share of total. Because these are cumulative totals of transaction
ﬂows, they differ from the investments/loans measured on a stock basis. Since this data
is based on the initial transaction to investigate directions of loan ﬂow, payments/
receipts do not balance for each subsector. Analysis focused on settlements looks at
both sides of the transaction, since all funds settlements are important, whether at the
transaction start (initial funding) or end (repayment). Because ﬁgures are subsector
averages, in some cases a speciﬁc ﬁrm can strongly impact the average, and in some
cases there are substantial differences within a subsector.
Money brokers account for the largest share in receivers of interbank funds, in
terms of both volume and value, followed by the major banks and foreign banks. The
ﬂow of interbank market funds between subsectors shows a considerable amount of
interbank direct dealing (DD) and direct settlement,
18 as well as a substantial amount
of funds money brokers’ receive from asset management trusts, around one-third of the
total funds provided (Table 4). Data on the balance of payments and receipts for each
subsector show foreign securities companies, securities companies, and foreign banks
as the biggest net receivers of funds (Figure 1).
18. In addition to DD, we think the data also include a substantial amount of transactions in which money brokers
make the match of demand and supply but the settlement is done directly between banks. We refer to this as
direct settlement to distinguish it from DD.

































































































































































































































































Major banks 7.0 2.2 2.4 0.0 0.0 2.8 8.5 0.3 0.0 14.7 0.2 0.0 1.5 0.5 40.4
Trust banks 4.2 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.0 12.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 20.2
Regional banks 7.4 1.4 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.3 0.3 0.0 30.3 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.1 44.8
Regional banks II 3.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0
Credit unions 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 2.0
Securities
companies 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.9
Foreign banks 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 4.5 0.0 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.9
Foreign securi-
ties companies 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4
Foreign trust
banks 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 8.0
Money brokers 6.0 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 1.0 3.4 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 13.0
Asset manage-
ment trusts 30.9 5.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 3.8 0.9 0.0 97.1 0.1 4.7 2.4 0.0 146.8
Securities ﬁnan-
cial companies 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3
Afﬁliated ﬁnan-
cial institutions 1.6 0.5 0.6 0.0 2.1 0.3 3.0 0.6 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 11.2
Public ﬁnancial
institutions 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.9
Total 62.3 11.7 5.8 0.1 2.1 7.9 23.0 8.1 0.0 186.6 0.9 6.1 5.9 1.6 322.8
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Figure 1 Balance of Payments and Receipts by Subsector
Network analysis frequently uses visualization with graphs, and Figure 2 shows an
example of this technique to look at the receivers of funds provided by 64 regional
banks. Money brokers were the biggest receivers, followed by major banks. Securities
companies and foreign banks also received these funds.
C. Comparison with December 1997
Next, we compare with December 1997, which was before the introduction of RTGS
andbeforetheimplementationofquantitativeeasing.Transactionsoutstandingdeclined
by almost half from 1997 to 2005, to ¥21 trillion from ¥39 trillion, while the transaction
ﬂow, shown in Table 5, declined even more, by around 75 percent. This difference
between the changes in stock and ﬂow can largely be attributed to systemic changes in
the handling of brokering unsecured loans by money brokers (these transactions, which
used to be settled by ﬂowing the funds through the broker’s account, are now, with
the introduction of RTGS, settled directly between the payer’s and receiver’s accounts).
Changes in settlement practice aimed at reducing the amount of funds settled, such as
nettingrepaymentsandtheirpairedpayments,havealsoservedtoreducetheﬂowtotals.
Accordingly, the change between 1997 and 2005 reﬂects changes in the settlement
system as well as structural changes in interbank transactions, and more accurately
should be viewed as structural changes in both payments and settlements. Looking at
the 1997 ﬂow of funds between subsectors with this in mind, we can summarize that
all subsectors both provided funds to and received funds from money brokers, that is,
they played the role of a hub in interbank money markets (Table 6).
123Figure 2 Receivers of Funds from Regional Banks
Table 5 Comparison of Value of Transactions by Subsector
December 1997 (¥ trillions) December 2005 (¥ trillions)
Payments Receipts Payments Receipts
Major banks 78 6% 450 35% 40 13% 62 19%
Trust banks 283 22 82 6 20 6 12 4
Regional banks 81 6 65 5 45 14 6 2
Regional banks II 23 2 14 1 15 5 0 0
Credit unions 6 0 3 0 2 1 2 1
Securities companies 29 2 15 1 2 1 8 2
Foreign banks 35 3 62 5 10 3 23 7
Foreign securities companies 4 0 13 1 1 0 8 3
Foreign trust banks 5 0 2 0 8 2 0 0
Money brokers 698 54 548 43 13 4 187 58
Asset management trusts – – – – 147 46 1 0
Securities ﬁnancial companies 1 0 14 1 5 2 6 2
Afﬁliated ﬁnancial institutions 27 2 12 1 11 3 6 2
Public ﬁnancial institutions 8 1 2 0 2 1 2 1
Total 1,281 100% 1,281 100% 322 100% 322 100%
Note: Figures in percentage column indicate share of total.
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Major banks 0020 0102 07 200 0 7 8
Trust banks 9000 0200 0 2 7 200 0 2 8 3
Regional banks 0000 0000 08 000 0 8 1
Regional banks II 0000 0000 02 300 0 2 3
C r e d i t u n i o n s 0000 0000 0 501 0 6
Securities companies 0100 0000 02 610 0 2 9
Foreign banks 0000 0006 02 800 0 3 5
Foreign securities companies 0000 0010 0 300 0 4
Foreign trust banks 0000 0000 0 500 0 5
Money brokers 437 79 63 14 2 13 60 4 2 0 12 10 2 698
Securities ﬁnancial companies 0000 0000 0 100 0 1
Afﬁliated ﬁnancial institutions 2000 1000 02 300 0 2 7
Public ﬁnancial institutions 0000 0000 0 700 0 8
Total 450 82 65 14 3 15 62 13 2 548 14 12 2 1,281
D. Daily Developments during December 2005
To observe the structure of interbank transactions on average, we analyze cumulative
transactions for the month. The daily changes in these transactions have a seasonal
pattern within the month, however, and thus the structure of transactions changes daily.
We attribute this variation to institutional factors, such as the last day of the reserve
maintenance period and the day that JGBs are issued, as well as to calendar (day-
of-the-week) factors. We brieﬂyc o n ﬁrm this as follows. Figure 3, which shows daily
changes in both the value and volume of transactions in December 2005, suggests a
tendency for the value and volume of transactions to increase approaching the ﬁnal day
of the reserve maintenance period (the 15th of every month). There is also a notable
increase, particularly in volume, prior to a weekend or consecutive holidays. JGBs used
to be issued on the 20th of the month, and both the value and volume of transactions
also increase around this time. When simulating a liquidity shock using actual data,
it is necessary to take into account the ﬂow characteristics of the relevant day when
choosing the day and when interpreting the results. The simulation in Appendix 1
uses the last day of the reserve maintenance period, which is the day with the largest
transaction amount.
125Figure 3 Daily Developments in Value and Volume of Transactions
Figure 4 Daily Transaction Value: Mean and Standard Deviation for 21 Trading Days
The magnitude of daily change in transactions differs by subsector. Figure 4 shows
the average over the 21 trading days in the month, and the volatility, of daily changes in
funds payments and receipts. Asset management trusts and money brokers both show
more volatility with large transaction values, but payments by money brokers show
greater volatility to the lower average. This suggests that even if there is a funds sur-
plus on average, demand for funds arises on speciﬁc days of the month, and this draws
an increase in payments by money brokers. Foreign banks have high volatility relative
to the average transaction amount, particularly in receiving payments. In contrast, al-
though the major banks on average have a large value of receipts, their payments are
more volatile, the opposite of the pattern exhibited by foreign banks, securities com-
panies, and foreign securities companies. These characteristics reﬂect interbank market
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conditions under quantitative easing, and we would expect both the pattern within the
month and the subsector characteristics to change depending on the period observed.
IV. Structure of Interbank Transaction Network
A. Overview
Network analysis frequently uses graphs to visualize network shapes. Following this,
Figure 5 is a graphical depiction of the network, that is, the transactions in the inter-
bank market. Each node represents a ﬁnancial institution, and each link denotes the
presence of a transactional relationship observed during the month. The network was
built around a hub of money brokers in 1997, but changed to a decentralized network
in 2005. Figure 6 shows a pattern diagram of this. The left panel depicts a star-shaped
(centralized) network in which each node is linked only to the hub, and this is a fairly
accurate depiction of the network in 1997. Table 6 above also conﬁrms that almost all
funds ﬂowed through money brokers.
In contrast to this, the right panel in Figure 6 is known as a complete network
wherein each node is connected to all other nodes, but as shown in Table 2, links in the
actual transaction network are extremely sparse, and not all nodes have a high degree,
as is the case in a complete network. A closer look at the bottom panel in Figure 5 for
2005 reveals that the network is not completely decentralized, and ﬁnancial institutions
withlarger transactionamounts (larger sizeof circles)arelocated closetothe centerand
appear to have fairly dense links (see the note to Figure 5 for an interpretation of node
positioning). Next, we use network statistics to look, one by one, at the characteristics
of the type of complex network depicted in Figure 5.
We start by conﬁrming the distribution of degree and strength for each node, broken
down by payments and receipts. This looks at the number of transaction counterparties
each ﬁnancial institution had during the month, as well as the gross transaction value.
Figure 7 (top) compares 1997 and 2005 for each ﬁnancial institution, in order of highest
in-degree. In 1997, links were concentrated on seven money brokers, which is all there
were that had in-bound links with at least 10 ﬁnancial institutions, but in 2005 there was
an increase in the number of institutions besides money brokers with a large number of
links, to a total of 53 with at least 10 in-bound links. We think the increase in high-
degree institutions would cause the decentralization seen in Figure 5. In addition, the
institutions with a small number of links in 1997 wound up reducing their number of
links even further. This could be interpreted as a narrowing of in-bound links to smaller
ﬁnancial institutions as a result of the reduction in funding needs caused by sustained
monetary easing policy. Nearly the same phenomenon could be observed with changes
in the out-degree distribution, although for smaller ﬁnancial institutions the reduction
in the number of outbound links was smaller than the reduction in in-bound links.
Looking next at the distribution of in-strength and out-strength (value of receipts
and payments) shown in Figure 8, the top-ranked institutions had disproportionately
high transaction values, and this tendency was more pronounced in 2005 than in 1997.
We think one reason is that mergers between money brokers and between the major
banks resulted in a consolidation of the top-ranked institutions. There was a downward
127Figure 5 Interbank Transaction Network
December 1997
December 2005
Note: We produced this graph using the network analysis software Pajek, and the drawing is
based on the Kamada-Kawai algorithm, which uses the attractive and repulsive forces
between linked nodes, and positions the nodes with the greater number of links closer to
the nodes with many links (the repulsive force acts between nodes, but this is
superseded by the resultant force of attractive forces acting within the node group).
Nodes connected by a single link have a strong repulsive force between them, resulting
in nodes being positioned farther apart. Nodes are positioned overall to minimize the
total energy from all attractive and repulsive forces, but because results are initial
node-positioning dependent, creation of the graph requires repeated attempts until
stable results can be achieved. The sizes of the circles within the graph are proportional
to the log of strength (transaction value), while color identiﬁes the subsector. The
Kamada-Kawai algorithm does not require data on strength or on the weight of each link
(the value and volume of transactions for each pair), but estimates node positioning
based only on whether there is a link.
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Figure 6 Star-Shaped Network (Centralized) and Complete Network (Decentralized)
Figure 7 Distribution of Degree by Direction of Funds Flow (In Log Form)
129Figure 8 Distribution of Valued Degree by Direction of Funds Flow (In Log Form)
shift in the overall distribution both for receipts and payments, reﬂecting the decline
in interbank transactions described in Section III. The downward shift was greater for
receipts than for payments, but since for any given period total payments and total
receiptsmustbalanceout,acomparisonofpaymentsandreceiptsin2005 showsthatthe
top receiving institutions had a relatively greater increase in transaction values than the
top paying institutions, conﬁrming that only some of the top-ranked receivers absorbed
the overall excess in payments.
A histogram of the transaction value distribution by ﬁnancial institution shows a
very long tail (Figure 9), a characteristic of not only the degree distribution but also
the distribution of the value and volume for each transaction pair. In many cases, this









and we conﬁrm this actually follows the distribution identiﬁed in the earlier studies
of Section II. See Appendix 2 for details.
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Figure 9 Long Tail Property: Distribution of Transaction Values
The fact that these degrees follow a power law distribution suggests that inter-
bank transaction networks are neither complete networks, star-shaped networks (pure
hub and spoke networks), nor random networks. High-degree nodes within a trans-
action network are the equivalent of hubs in a star network, but the other nodes are
not all linked only to the hub, and there are some nodes of middling degree. Network
theory developed theoretical models that involved a network creation mechanism to
explain the emergence of the power law distribution of a degree widely seen in social
networks. The inducement that creates links between nodes and the mechanism of net-
work growth are particularly important for the emergence of the power law distribution.
Section IV.D provides more detail regarding the inducements of link creation in the
interbank transaction network.
B. Two-Tier Structure with Core and Periphery
Figure 5 shows that even as the network becomes more decentralized, there still exist
portions of the network that serve as a core. We tried to identify these ﬁnancial in-
stitutions at the core of the transaction network using the statistic called core degree
(Figure 10). A core is a high-density sub-network, all of whose members have at least
￿ links, and is close to a complete network, where all members are linked with each
other. This
￿ is called the core degree.
19 Figure 10 shows the 34 ﬁnancial institutions
with the highest core degree
￿ (18) in 2005. Creating a sub-network out of these, all 34
members would have at least 18 links. The number of ﬁnancial institutions increases as
the core degree hurdle is lowered, but given the lack of any standard for what constitutes
a core, we built our sub-network of those ﬁnancial institutions with the highest core
degree
￿. This core network comprises money brokers, major banks, asset management
trusts, trust banks, major securities companies (both domestic and foreign), afﬁliated
ﬁnancial institutions, and some major regional banks. These subsectors were positioned
19. The core described here is deﬁned as a
￿-core. Network theory also uses another concept of an
￿-core.
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at the core of the interbank transaction network. The change from 1997 shown in Fig-
ure 10 makes it clear that (1) links within the core have a higher density (core degree
has increased) and (2) the number of nodes in the core has increased. This implies that
the network has become more decentralized in line with the growth of the core. Table 7
shows the average degree and average core degree for each subsector, calculated by the
degrees of individual institutions.
We measured the clustering coefﬁcient to observe the relationship between the
nodes comprising the core portion of the network and other nodes. As noted in Sec-
tion II, the clustering coefﬁcient measures the link density of a sub-network comprising
all the nodes linked to a given target node. Figure 11 plots the relationship between
clustering coefﬁcient and degree for each ﬁnancial institution. Institutions located in
area A of the ﬁgure have an extremely high number of links, but a low clustering co-
efﬁcient, and are nearly the same ﬁnancial institutions that comprise the core described
above. The large number of links implies that these institutions are connected to nodes
outside of the core on the network periphery, and thus function as a hub for the entire
network. The clustering coefﬁcient of these nodes shows a low average density despite
belonging to the core, because the sub-network includes these peripheral nodes.
Institutions in area B, meanwhile, have a small number of direct links, but form a
close-knit network with the transaction partners, which appear to transact only with a
small number of select institutions. Some regional banks, foreign banks, and foreign
securities companies were included here. Institutions in area C have a small number
of fragmented transaction partners, and thus either have a few links to the core or
form a local, small-scale network outside of the core. We revisit this below using
different statistics.
The network statistics described above show us regarding the interbank transaction
network in 2005 that (1) it had a two-tier structure with a core and periphery, (2) nearly
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Table 7 Changes in In-Degree, Out-Degree, and Core Degree: Average by Subsector
December 2005 December 1997
In-degree Out-degree Core degree In-degree Out-degree Core degree
Major banks 31.2 32.0 18.0 6.4 4.5 10.4
Trust banks 10.1 11.8 10.8 2.9 4.2 6.9
Regional banks 5.6 8.9 9.7 3.0 3.9 7.0
Regional banks II 1.5 3.1 3.5 2.9 2.9 5.6
Credit unions 1.1 1.7 1.9 1.0 1.0 1.5
Securities
companies
12.0 6.2 7.5 5.4 2.3 3.7
Foreign banks 7.0 2.1 6.2 3.6 2.2 5.4
Foreign securi-
ties companies
7.3 2.9 8.2 2.4 0.9 2.2
Foreign trust
banks
1.0 2.3 2.8 2.0 0.4 2.4
Money brokers 76.7 36.7 18.0 133.9 146.9 12.0
Asset manage-
ment trusts
20.3 41.7 18.0 – – –
Securities ﬁnan-
cial companies
9.3 4.0 8.0 3.0 2.0 5.0
Afﬁliated ﬁnan-
cial institutions
26.8 56.3 17.5 5.3 3.5 7.3
Public ﬁnancial
institutions
9.0 6.6 8.8 4.5 3.0 5.0
Note: Subsector averages use zeros for the statistics of ﬁnancial institutions without links. Core
degree is calculated for an undirected network using both in-bound and out-bound links.
Figure 11 Clustering Coefﬁcient and Degree
133Figure 12 Two-Tier Structure with Core and Periphery
all members in its core were linked to every other member in what was close to a
complete network, (3) the core served as a hub for the periphery, and (4) the periphery
had clustering (there were either mutual links among a small number of peripheral
members, or links to a certain node of the core. Figure 12 diagrams this concept, which
we think can represent one of properties of the actual network in the bottom panel
of Figure 5.
C. Small-World Network
The structural changes that have occurred in the interbank transaction network are
critical from the systemic risk perspective. The mechanism by which liquidity shocks
caused by delayed or failed settlements at some ﬁnancial institutions are propagated
to the entire interbank market, or likewise absorbed in the process of propagation, de-
pends greatly on network topology. The literature conﬁrms that the entire payment and
settlement network is connected through a very small number of steps. In this paper as
well, we measure the number of steps required for a given ﬁnancial institution to reach
other ﬁnancial institutions throughout the network and the average number of the steps,
namely, average distance.
The distribution of average distance in 2005 showed that the top 200 nodes were
linked to all other nodes in the network in no more than three steps, on average, an
indication that the interbank transaction network represents a very small world (Fig-
ure 13). As explained in Section II, a small-world network has a small number of
links relative to the number of nodes and thus sparse network density, and a tendency
to cluster among nodes of similar relevancy. Despite these properties, the network’s
average distance is short and can reach a very wide domain in only a few steps. Recent
research on social networks has shown that these interesting features can be attributed
to the presence of a small number of hubs and short-cut links, and in our study this
appears to be the role played by the core described above. Particularly because the core
is nearly a complete network, even if two given peripheral nodes are not linked to the
same hub, they can be linked via a single step within the core.
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Figure 13 Average Distance for Each Node
The inﬂuence domain, expressed in the number of reachable nodes, is deﬁned not
only by the domain of direct links (the domain reachable in a single step), but by any










order of largest degree in the horizontal axis, makes it clear that a substantial portion
of the network is reachable in two steps. In a small-world network, it is possible for a
shock originating in one portion of the system to easily spread to the entire network,
and thus the ﬁnancial system’s small-world property suggests the potential presence of
systemic risk.
D. The Periphery’s Links to the Core
The network structure we have seen so far reﬂects what drives individual ﬁnancial in-
stitutions to select their transaction counterparties. Although it is self-evident that in-
stitutional factors in the settlement and interbank markets described in Section III are
important determinants of the structure, there must be an economic rationale (the need
for an efﬁcient, easy-to-use market that makes it easy to initiate transactions freely,
securely, and at low cost) behind the system design and the various actual constraints
faced by the market participants. Given these backgrounds, the interbank markets
developed and formed transaction relationships that determined the network structure.
Some studies are investigating theoretical models generating networks that can
mimic the small-world and scale-free properties observed in the real world. Such
models include the preferential choice model,
20 where a greater number of links makes
linkage more attractive to other nodes, models in which the tendency of a node to
attract links from other nodes is determined proportional to certain criteria other than
20. Links between websites over the Internet also follow a power law distribution. The idea is that once a website
reaches a certain level of recognition, its links expand rapidly, resulting in more visitors and accelerated growth
in the number of its links. It has been shown that the creation of a power law distribution can be explained by
a combination of a preferential choice model and a network growth model.
135Figure 14 Domain of Each Node
Note: The maximum domain differs between a receipt network (top panel) and a payment
network (bottom panel), because some nodes only do one of either sending or receiving
payments. The one-to-two-link domain also differs in a bidirectional network.
the existing number of links, and models in which the afﬁnity between nodes gives a
likelihood to connect each other, that is, links are more easily formed the higher or
lower the similarity.
Figure 15 looks at the afﬁnity between nodes in the transaction network. The hor-
izontal axis shows the degree for each node, while the vertical axis shows the average
nearest neighbor degree (ANND), which is the average of the degrees for all nodes
directly connected to the node in question.
21 The ﬁgure conﬁrms that the larger degree a
ﬁnancial institution has, the lower average of degrees its counterparties have, and vice
21. In Figure 15, the number of links on the horizontal axis is in-degree, and the average number of links for each




pair of in-degree and out-degree examined.
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Figure 15 Afﬁnity: Disassortative
versa. It is noted that many ﬁnancial institutions have a small degree and counterparties
with a small average of degrees, which will be discussed below.
This would imply a tendency for institutions with a small degree to form ties with
institutions with a large degree. A network relationship in which links are more likely
with similar nodes is called assortative, and that where links are more likely with
dissimilar nodes is called disassortative. Overall, the interbank transaction network
tends to be disassortative in terms of degree. This tendency that has been conﬁrmed
by Soramäki et al. (2006) for the Fedwire settlement network in the United States and
by Iori et al. (2008) for Italy’s interbank transaction network.
In addition, the large number of samples in the lower left of Figure 15 also shows
an afﬁnity for linkage between low-degree institutions. This suggests that there are two
types of peripheral networks, (1) those with strong linkage to the core and (2) those
with relatively weak links to the core. This suggests a difference from earlier studies in
the sense that the network cannot be viewed simply as disassortative. Figure 16 plots
the ANND on the vertical axis (as in Figure 15) and the clustering coefﬁcient on the
horizontal axis for nodes with a degree of 20 or less, that is, peripheral nodes. The
group located in the upper right is composed of nodes within those described in (1)
above (with strong links to the core) that are densely clustered among peripheral nodes,
while those in the upper left are composed of nodes within those described in (1) above
with a strong tendency to link only with the core. The group located in the lower left
equates to those nodes in (2) (with relatively weak links to the core) with few links to
other peripheral nodes.
22
22. Nodes located in the lower right quadrant have a large clustering coefﬁcient, and we think this coefﬁcient
is larger because of the large number of nodes with a small degree and the presence of links within a small
137Figure 16 Two Peripheries
E. The Network and Systemic Risk
We take a qualitative look at the interbank transaction network characteristics de-
scribed above from three perspectives, to see what they imply regarding the stability,
and robustness to shocks, of interbank transactions.
First, we take the perspective in which interbank market participants play an im-
portant role. This can be uniquely identiﬁed based on each ﬁnancial institution’s trans-
action data. Speciﬁcally, institutions that are connected with a large number of other
institutions (have a high degree) and have a large value and volume of transactions
(have a high strength) are important to the interbank market not only as senders and
receivers of funds, but also in terms of contagion triggered by settlement delay/failure.
Also important is their positioning within the network when taking into account
the indirect impacts. If the institution is part of the network’s densely linked core, it
may have a large impact on other important market participants as well as on periph-
eral nodes linked to the core. The former suggests network interdependency in which
a node’s importance is determined by the importance of its counterparties, while the
latter suggests that even for institutions without either a high degree or high strength,
their importance as a supplier of funds increases locally if they send funds to periph-
eral nodes, and furthermore these nodes are not normally connected with other core
members (i.e., have not established large credit lines that allow for immediate funding
when necessary).
The second perspective relates to the network structure. If the core network mal-
functions and its activities in money markets go down, or if there is a cascade of set-
tlement failures within the core, the short average distance makes it possible that the
sub-network. For example, the clustering coefﬁcient for a triangular network composed of three nodes and
three links is one.
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shock will immediately spread to the entire network. Shocks that arise on the periphery
can reach the core through links with core members, and if the core does not absorb this
shock, its spillover to the entire network may occur. Because core members are larger
than institutions on the periphery, even if the core members are able to nearly absorb
the shock within the core, there might be a risk that shock waves, albeit small, will head
to the periphery in the process of absorption. Financial institutions on the periphery are
small on average, making it conceivable that a small shock wave could have a large
adverse impact on them.
A third perspective concerns the central bank’s supply of liquidity when interbank
money markets are under stress. The ﬁnancial market turmoil triggered by the subprime
crisis with collapse of the securitization markets expanded to short-term money mar-
kets in the United States and Europe, and led to a notable tightening of funding and
a contraction of credit. The Fed and the European Central Bank (ECB) undertook
dynamic and ﬂexible operations while introducing new operational measures in an
attempt to improve their ability to supply much liquidity and stabilize the market. A
necessary condition to designing such measures is probably knowledge of the ﬁnancial
institutions through which liquidity provided by a central bank can be circulated more
efﬁciently and effectively.
23
Given the core/periphery two-tier network structure described thus far, it seems
that the most efﬁcient and effective way to ensure circulation of funds through the en-
tire network is to focus the supply of liquidity on core members. This only holds during
normal times, however, and there is a concern that when interbank money markets are
under stress, and particularly when core members are under stress, the usual ﬁnancial
intermediation will fail to function. To cope with the stagnation of funds within the
core and the inability of the core to supply funds to cover funds insufﬁciencies on
the periphery for any reason, it may be necessary to give not only core members but
also peripheral members access to the central bank’s liquidity supplying facilities. In
addition, even if all members of a local network clustered on the periphery are not
linked to the core, as long as one member is linked to the core or can access the
liquidity supplying facilities of the central bank, there is a possibility that funds can
be redistributed internally among the local network. One measure implemented by the
Fed in August 2007 was the Term Auction Facility, a new facility of supplying liquidity
to depositary ﬁnancial institutions. This can be seen as an additional way to directly
supply liquidity to periphery members.
24
We limit our discussion here to the qualitative characteristics that can be inferred
from the network structure. Actual transaction networks, as shown graphically, are
considerably more complex than the conceptual diagram in Figure 12, and a further
quantitative examination would be necessary to know the accuracy of our observations
23. Of course, the actual network design must take into consideration such factors as the choice of means to supply
funds, the length of the loan, collateral requirements, and central bank disclosures on liquidity supplied, all of
which is information needed to make the proper choices.
24. The Fed has introduced various methods to supply liquidity to primary dealers, which are the equivalent of
core members. Soramäki et al. (2006), which analyzed the Fedwire interbank payment network, found that 66
of the 7,000 participating ﬁnancial institutions accounted for 75 percent of the value transferred, and that of
those, 25 formed a densely connected core sub-network, or clique. Although the paper did not offer details, we
conjecture this core sub-network included many primary dealers.
139regarding the transmission of shock. Appendix 1, as a ﬁrst approximation to a dynamic
quantitative analysis, presents the simulation to examine how a liquidity shock is trans-
mitted within the network, using actual data but under admittedly strong assumptions.
V. Conclusion
The interbank market’s transaction and settlement ﬂows have changed substantially in
the last decade. We extract data on interbank transaction from BOJ-NET’s settlement
data, and use network theory, which has increasingly been applied to the social sciences
in recent years, to investigate the characteristics of the interbank market’s complex fund
ﬂows as a transaction network, using a variety of network statistics. We also examine
the structural changes in interbank transactions by comparing data for December 1997,
which was prior to the implementation of RTGS in 2001 and implementation of the
ZIRP in 1999, with data for December 2005, after RTGS was implemented and while
the quantitative easing policy was in force.
We ﬁnd that interbank payment ﬂows have changed from a star-shaped network
with money brokers mediating at the hub to a decentralized network with numerous
other channels. Whereas in 1997 the linkages were concentrated on money brokers,
in 2005 there were more institutions with multiple links, and this resulted in a de-
centralization of the network. We also ﬁnd that those institutions that originally had
a small number of links saw an even further decrease in the number of their links, and
that this tendency was more signiﬁcant for those receiving payments.
Within the decentralized network in 2005 was a core network comprising money
brokers, major banks, asset management trusts, trust banks, major securities compa-
nies, afﬁliated ﬁnancial institutions, and some large regional banks; this core was very
densely linked and nearly a complete network. These core members served as a hub for
ﬁnancial institutions on the network’s periphery, making it possible for nearly the entire
network to be connected with an average of two to three steps of links. Links from the
core to the periphery are heterogeneous, and there are local clusters on the periphery.
The structure of the network is a critical determinant of systemic risk. The mech-
anism by which liquidity shocks caused by delayed or failed settlements at some
ﬁnancial institutions are propagated to the entire interbank market, or likewise ab-
sorbed on the way of propagation, depends greatly on network topology. We there-
fore simulate a liquidity shock based on certain assumptions to quantitatively analyze
the transmission of that shock, in addition to making a qualitative examination of the
network structure.
Our analysis does not include looking at how ﬁnancial institutions react to liquidity
shocks or at how such a reaction affects the shock’s propagation. To assess the interbank
market’s stability and robustness to shock, it would be worthwhile to examine how the
networkischangedbyreactivebehavior,andhowthisreducestheintermediaryfunction
of the interbank market.
This should be possible to achieve with a case study during a period of stress. For
example, interbank markets in the United States and Europe have been under consider-
able stress since the summer of 2007, and this may suggest that the market transaction
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structure is shaped differently than usual. It would probably be useful to observe the
process of change on a daily basis and examine, from the network perspective, whether
ﬁnancial institutions serving in each role, as well as the interbank market overall, be-
came less functional. There are a variety of explanations for why ﬁnancial institutions
might change their behavior during this process, including for their own reasons such
as the increasing difﬁculty for fund-raising, external reasons such as a contraction of
credit to those ﬁnancial institutions perceived as having an increased counterparty risk,
and a greater hesitancy to supply funds within a less liquid market.
The study of such reactions and the reasons should also be useful when considering
the mechanisms for recovery from a market malfunction. In particular, this is likely to
provideimplicationsforacentralbankconsideringmeasures,includingspeciﬁcw aysto
supply liquidity, to deal with a liquidity crisis and restore market conditions to normal.
Also important is the relationship between market stability and efﬁciency during
normal times. A market that prioritizes stability and robustness may be less efﬁcient in
ﬁnancial intermediation, but it is also possible that there is not a tradeoff, but rather a
complementary relationship, between the two. This paper does not look at the efﬁciency
of ﬁnancial networks, but we think that applying network analysis to an examination of
them would be useful.
APPENDIX 1: SIMULATING THE TRANSMISSION OF A LIQUIDITY
SHOCK
To observe the structure of interbank transactions on average, we analyze cumulative
transactions for the month. We also consider the implications that the characteristics of
this structure have for systemic risk. It is very difﬁcult to measure a network’s dynamic
reaction to shocks using a qualitative approach based on static structural information.
In addition, as shown in Section III.D, the value and volume of transactions varies
daily, as does which ﬁnancial institutions lend and which borrow, and accordingly, the
payment structure changes daily. How a liquidity shock, including funding shortages
and settlement failure, propagates across the network when an RTGS system is in
place depends strongly on information regarding settlement amount (which equates to
the “thickness” of linkages) as well as on information regarding the order and timing
of payments.
In this appendix, we run a simulation based on actual data as a ﬁrst approximation,
albeit under several strong assumptions. Although our analysis is of the transaction
network, when examining a time series of funds ﬂowing across the network from the
perspective of contagion, it effectively becomes an analysis of the settlement network.
Our simulation uses settlement data from the start of the transaction as well as data
at the end of the transaction. A shock from a shortage of funds and settlement fail-
ure implies delays/defaults in the ﬂow of repayments, and results in contagion effects
whereby the non-arrival of expected repayments makes it necessary to suspend lend-
ing. Consequently, the timing and amount of ﬂows at the start of the transaction are
also important.
141Appendix Figure 1 Fund Lending and Borrowing by the Hour (December 2005)
A. Intraday Developments
Because the time of settlement is important to our simulation, we ﬁrst look at the status
of intraday settlements. Appendix Figure 1 shows the amount of BOJ-NET settlements
every hour beginning with the 9:00 opening. In December 2005, most of the lending
by the largest lender of funds, asset management trusts, occurred at around 09:00 and
14:15. We ascribe this second peak in the afternoon to these trusts lending their liquid
funds on the interbank market after determining fund inﬂows and redemptions for that
day. These funds include loans in the name of investment trusts on the secured interbank
market as well as loans in the name of trust banks on the unsecured interbank market.
Most lending by the major banks is on the unsecured interbank market, and nearly all
of these loans are completed in the ﬁrst hour (09:00 to 09:59). Lending by the regional
banks peaks twice, from 09:00 to 09:59 mostly of unsecured loans, and from 15:00
to 16:59 mostly of secured loans. We think the latter funds are lent after settlements
within the Data Telecommunications System of All Banks (Zengin System) are com-
pleted (settlement instructions in the Zengin System are completed by 15:30, and its
ﬁnal DNS timing over BOJ-NET is 16:15
25). Reﬂecting this institutional design, money
brokers’ receipt of funds peak twice, from 09:00 to 09:59 and from 14:00 to 15:59.
The RTGS system, which settles each payment order individually, is less efﬁcient
than the DNS system, which settles orders netted out in batches. The RTGS system
gives each ﬁnancial institution an incentive to try to minimize its funding burden by
receiving payments prior to making them. From the perspective of the counterparty
receiving the payment, this delays receipt of funds and increases the uncertainty of the
timing of receipts. Because the RTGS system itself has no mechanism to negate the
moral hazard created by having to depend on receipts from counterparties to ensure
fund payments, if a ﬁnancial institution holds back payments to evade funding cost, it
delays the payments from the ﬁnancial institution that was expecting that payment.
These payment delays are spread from institution to institution in a domino effect
25. The Zengin System, a private-sector settlement system operated by the Tokyo Bankers Association, executes
inboundandoutboundpaymentsforbanktransfers, wires,andotherdomesticsmall-scalepaymentinstructions,
as well as calculates the amount of transfer settlements. Through DNS with the Zengin System, all debits and
credits are converted to bilateral debits/credits between the Tokyo Bankers Association and each ﬁnancial
institution, and the ﬁnal unnetted amounts are settled using the BOJ’s current account.
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that develops into a system-wide gridlock.
26 When implementing RTGS in BOJ-NET,
ﬁnancial institutions and their association promoted settlements based on the repay-
ment priority rule (repayments concentrated during the hour starting at 09:00) and the
one-hour rule (settlement within one hour of execution), and otherwise took measures
to avoid gridlock. BOJ-NET also introduced an overdraft system, through which the
BOJ provides intraday loans up to the amount of collateral for use in settlements, as a
way to ease intraday payment frictions.
27
B. Simulation Rules and Assumptions
We use data on transactions settled under these rules and practices to simulate a liquid-
ity shock, as follows. As noted in the main text, the interbank transaction network has
changed from a structure built around money brokers at the hub to a more decentralized
structure, but money brokers are still the primary intermediaries in money markets.
Within this context, one of the stress scenarios that we simulated is a liquidity shock
in which there is an interruption of the settlement of funds sent from money brokers to
foreign banks and to securities ﬁrms (domestic and foreign), which are the institutions
likely to have less collateral available to use intraday overdrafts from the BOJ than are
commercial banks.
We started each ﬁnancial institution off with maximum liquidity, that is, the mini-
mum required funds needed to settle all of that day’s transactions without delay.
28 We
also added a constraint that says ﬁnancial institutions with delayed receipts cannot go
elsewhere for funding in order to make a payment. Consequently, under the above li-
quidity shock the institution must wait until it receives a deposit from another ﬁnancial
institution (such as repayment associated with the maturing of a past transaction), and
must temporarily suspend payments in the interim.
29
This is not a realistic assumption, because in the real world a ﬁnancial institution
short of funds is likely to pursue other channels to obtain funding, while the central
26. There is a substantial body of literature on the contagion of payment delays under RTGS. McAndrews and
Potter (2002) and Lacker (2004) both offer interesting research on payment delays in New York following the
9/11 terrorist attacks.
27. McAndrews (2006) classiﬁes friction related to intraday liquidity transactions into three categories: search fric-
tion (from searching for a counterparty), timing friction (from protecting settlement deadlines), and incentive
friction (between the incentives of each counterparty).
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￿ representing the time that the payment system closes). In
this case, the upper-bound liquidity at the start of the business day for the entire payment system is maintained.







￿, every settlement will be completed according to schedule (there will
be no payment delays).
29. Actually, settlements are often made in the order in which instructions are executed, which suggests that a ﬁrst-
inﬁrst-out (FIFO) rule is beingused. UnderFIFO, ifthere are instructionsto make paymentson two obligations
that have not been paid because of a lack of funds—for example, a ¥1 billion transaction followed in the queue
by a ¥500 million transaction—if a deposit of ¥700 million comes in from another bank, the ¥500 million
transaction will not be settled until the ¥1 billion transaction is settled. For our simulation, however, we weaken
that rule to a “bypass FIFO” rule, which in this case would mean that the order of execution would be ignored
to allow the ¥700 million to be used for settlement of the ¥500 million transaction, even with the ¥1 billion
transaction not having been settled yet. Because liquidity sinks (funds waiting on a payment), and a contagion
of payment delays, are normally more likely to occur under FIFO than under bypass FIFO, there is a possibility
that our results understate the payment delay contagion. The simulation in Imakubo and Soejima (2010) uses
BOJ-NET settlement data under the FIFO rule.
143bank is likely to supply funds so as to maintain a macro balance of funding supply-
demand. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that when modeling payment behavior in
response to a lack of funds and including this in the simulation, the assumptions will
have a major impact on the simulation results. To ﬁrst observe the transmission of a
liquidity shock under the basic assumption that institutions will respond by delaying
their own payments without seeking funds elsewhere, we ran the simulation under the
constraints noted above.
30
We ran our simulation on data for December 15, 2005, the last day of the re-
serve maintenance period and the day of the month with the largest transaction value.
We used every transaction settled on BOJ-NET that day (excluding settlements of
JGB transactions).
Individual transaction data comprises the sender of the transfer, the receiver of the
transfer, and the time the transfer instruction was input.
C. Simulation Results
If settlements are done in the order that transfer instructions are input, settlement would
be delayed because payments expected from money brokers were not made in this sim-
ulation. In some cases, payment delays were quickly ﬁxed upon receipt of repayments,
but in other cases they led to a cascade of delays. Appendix Figure 2 shows the status
of delays. The horizontal axis shows delayed transactions in the left panel and shows
transactions that never settled before closing time in the right panel, in both cases
ordered by the time that transfer instructions were input. The vertical axis in the left
for line charts shows the time of actual settlement after instructions were received, and
also the time of settlement following the delay. The vertical axis in the right for bar
chart shows the amount of transactions that were delayed.
Excluding the ¥600 billion of payments from money brokers to foreign banks and
both domestic and foreign securities ﬁrms, on that day there were 10,149 transactions
for ¥59 trillion, of which 30 transactions (¥1 trillion) had delayed settlements and
10 transactions (¥200 billion) never settled that day. Most of the delays that occurred
during the hour from 09:00 were only delayed slightly and were for very small values
(transactions 1, 2, and 8–21 show as near zero in the left panel). After that, some
relatively large transactions were delayed, and the time of delay was also longer.
31
The payment delays did not stay within the subsectors initially deﬁned in the model
as being directly affected by liquidity shock, but spread to ﬁnancial institutions in
other subsectors.
In addition, one of the delayed payments was for settlement of an outstanding neg-
ative balance on a private-sector DNS system. This suggests the risk that a liquidity
30. Simulations that assume rule-based reactions are known as behavioral simulations. There are other behav-
ioral simulations with reactions given by either a neural network or linear judgment, as well as the variable
parametric ﬁtting approach based on a simple probability distribution of reaction deviations without regard to
behavioral principles. There is a considerable body of literature that, like Imakubo and Soejima (2010), as-
sumes rule-based reactions. Leinonen and Soramäki (1999) and Bech and Soramäki (2001) provide a summary
of concepts used in settlement simulations. Our simulation here assumes a rule-based reaction whereby the
ﬁnancial institution does not seek funding when unable to pay, but waits until it receives funds.
31. Because it is unclear whether this characteristic is unique to the day selected for simulation or is common
enough to occur on other days, we do not think any implications can be drawn from this simulation result alone.
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Appendix Figure 2 Simulated Contagion of Payment Delays
Note: This simulation uses the BOJ-NET simulator developed by the Yajima Lab at the Tokyo
Institute of Technology.
shock can affect not only transactions settled in the RTGS system but also those settled
in other DNS systems.
32
Even when ﬁnancial intermediation between ﬁnancial institutions breaks down,
many of those institutions caught in the contagion of delays actually have the option of
intraday overdrafts and supplementary loans through pooled collateral in the BOJ, and
even without depending on these loans there are a variety of other market instruments
that make funding available with some burden of a higher rate. This should make it
possible to prevent transmission of the shock. That said, there might be a case of
interest rates rising on some funding transactions, and of some delays in settlement
time. Another conceivable action that could be taken ahead of time to deal with funding
shortages is to hold reserves in excess of the reserve requirements.
APPENDIX 2: POWER LAW AND SCALE-FREE DISTRIBUTIONS
Information on the degree distribution is critical to statistically understanding a net-
work structure. If a given node has the probability
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￿ becomes larger, the binomial distribution can be approximated by a Poisson
distribution, and thus the degree distribution of a random network (a network in which
links between the
￿ nodes occur randomly at a given probability) follows a Poisson
distribution. In a real network, however, the probability of a link forming between each




  differs from a Poisson distribution.
32. Even if a DNS system is not completed by the scheduled time, private-sector settlement systems have risk man-
agement mechanisms in place that will initiate liquidity supplying measures in accordance with the situation.
These measures provide a mechanism whereby a pre-selected liquidity supplying bank supplies funds to ensure
settlement completed within that day.
145Appendix Figure 3 Degree Distribution for an Undirected Network (December 2005)
Appendix Figure 3 shows the degree distribution in December 2005, where the






 .T h eﬁgure shows that most of the nodes have a very small
degree, the number of nodes declines rapidly as degree increases, but never becomes
zero, and there are occasionally nodes with a high degree. Such a distribution can often











Power law distributions can be observed not only for the degree and strength of
a network, but also throughout the man-made and natural world. Examples include
a corporation’s sales and number of employees, the population of cities and villages,
the size of the glass shards from a broken window, the rate of change in asset prices,
and the number of copies of a book that are sold. A power law distribution follows a
distribution where the exponent remains the same even when multiplying the stochas-













 , and thus is not dependent on the
scale of the variables. This is why it is also known as a scale-free distribution. For
example, company size based on amount of debt follows a power law distribution, and
assuming that a large bank lends to large to mid-sized companies and a small bank lends
to small to medium-sized companies, irrespective of the average difference in bank loan
values, the distribution of loan amounts by company for the two banks will follow the
same power law distribution.
33 This suggests that just as a large bank has customers that
are large for it, a small bank has customers that, even with small absolute amounts, are
large for it, and the failure of a large customer results in the same relative damage for
both banks.
This lack of dependence on scale is known as self-similarity, or “fractality.” A
power law distribution has this fractality, and displays a characteristic that, when for
example graphing the rate of change in the exchange rate or stock prices on various
time scales (monthly, daily, every 10 minutes, every minute), all are so similar that it is
difﬁcult to tell which time scale the graph is based on.
33. The last graph in Box 7 of Bank of Japan (2006) shows how corporate loan balances follow a power law
distribution.
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A simple way to conﬁrm a power law distribution is to conﬁrm that a graph of the
logarithmic forms of frequency (or probability found by dividing frequency by the total
number of samples) and the probability variable
￿ are linear in shape. Here, we take
























 ,w h e r et h e
slope
￿
  is a straight line. The number of samples does not smoothly decline for every
￿, and the number of domains where there are no sample increases as
￿ gets larger.
These cases are often depicted as a cumulative distribution in a log-log plot graph.
Integrating the power law distribution’s density function, the exponent of
￿
  increases






  as the slope of the cumulative
distribution. Appendix Figure 4 looks at this in the context of the interbank transaction
network. The payment network’s in-degree cumulative distribution at the upper left
shows, when excluding the top-two institutions and institutions with an in-degree of






the undirected network (without regard to whether the link is for incoming funds or
outgoing funds) in the second graph from the top on the left, however, the power rises
from 2.0 to 3.4 passing 30 degrees. Not only here but in many other power law distri-
butions, limitation of natural resource and other results in the sudden disappearance of
nodes with a high degree. This can be expressed with a distribution wherein an
￿ larger


















147Appendix Figure 4 Power Law Distribution and Exponent: Degree and Strength
Note: Distributions are shown for strength in number of transactions for each node and
strength in value of transactions for each node, while the bottom two graphs look at the
number and value of transactions for each pair of ﬁnancial institutions.
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